# European Commission Study on Sustainable Corporate Governance

Alex Edmans, LBS Centre for Corporate Governance and ECGI

ECGI, November 2020



"Let the jury consider their verdict," the King said, for about the twentieth time that day.



"No, no!"
said the
Queen.
"Sentence
first – verdict
afterwards!"



#### The Approach

- EC should be commended for undertaking a study on such an important topic: diagnosis precedes treatment
- Data is not evidence
  - Data is a collection of facts
  - Evidence supports one particular conclusion and rules out others. See TED talk, "What to Trust in a Post-Truth World"
- > 95% of papers are rejected by top journals
- Evidence quoted is one-sided, as if authors have decided on a conclusion and reverse-engineered evidence to support it

# Short-Term Shareholder Value


- European Commission: "The focus of corporate decision-makers on short-term shareholder value maximisation"
  - Advocates a move towards "stakeholder capitalism"
- Finance 101: shareholder value is an inherently longterm concept
  - The solution may be more shareholder capitalism, not less
  - The problem isn't shareholder capitalism, but managerial capitalism
    - Bebchuk and Tallarita (2020)
    - Flugum and Souther (2020)
    - Raghunandan and Rajgopal (2020)




- European Commission: "The focus of corporate decision-makers on short-term shareholder value maximisation"
  - Advocates a move towards "stakeholder capitalism"
- Finance 101: shareholder value is an inherently longterm concept
  - The solution may be more shareholder capitalism, not less



- Series of studies by Alon Brav, Wei Jiang and coauthors
- Stock price increases by 7%
  - No long-term reversal
  - After exit (2 years), stock prices keep rising for next 3 years
- Increased ROA
- Increased total factor productivity (output relative to labour input)
- Increased labour productivity










- IT investment rises
- R&D expenditure falls
  - But number and quality of patents rises
- Increased performance of plants and patents sold
- Higher CEO turnover
- New directors have
  - Better credentials in general
  - More technology- and industry-based expertise in particular



- Study assumes a fixed-pie mentality
  - Shareholder value is at the expense of stakeholder value
  - Stakeholder capitalism should be anti-shareholder capitalism
- But the pie is not fixed (Ch 4, 6 of "Grow the Pie")
  - CEOs can increase it by innovation and excellence; decrease it through coasting or pursuing own pet projects
  - Reducing shareholder accountability won't move from shareholder capitalism to stakeholder capitalism, but to managerial capitalism
- Say-on-purpose





## 3. Shareholder Payouts

- "Upward trend in shareholder pay-outs" is evidence of a "focus on short-term benefits of shareholders rather than on the long-term interests of the company"
- Lazonick (2014): 91% of net income went to investors, which "left very little investments in productive capabilities or higher incomes for employees"
- Ch 7: positive ST and LT returns to payouts
  - Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) for dividends
  - Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), Manconi,
     Peyer, and Vermaelen (2019) for repurchases
- Bennett et al. (2017) and PwC/Edmans (2019): buybacks don't inflate CEO pay



## 3. Shareholder Payouts

- Finance 101: invest if and only if NPV > 0. Investment is not always good for society
- Partial equilibrium thinking: Fried and Wang (2019),
   Chen (2018)



#### 4. Loyalty Shares

- Arguments for "long-term shareholders" confuses the holding period of a shareholder with the horizon
  - ST selling could be based on LT information: Edmans (2009)
  - Trades of blocks improve firm value: Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Barclay and Holderness (1991)
  - Loyalty schemes reward doing nothing (VW)
  - "ST" shareholders help companies adapt to changes in competitive environment: Giannetti and Yu (2020)