My work on blockholders (large shareholders) studies how blockholders play a critical role in corporate governance due to their large stakes – alleviating concerns on the “separation of ownership and control” and the “ownerless corporation”. In particular, I show how blockholders can exert governance not only through “voice” (engaging with companies) but also “exit” (voting with their feet). Contrary to conventional wisdom, exit is a governance mechanism in itself, not the antithesis of governance, and short-term exit can encourage long-term behavior by firms.

Surveys

Survey in Annual Review of Financial Economics (briefer) (Edmans 2014)

Chapter for Handbook of Corporate Governance (more extensive, containing hand-collected data on blockholders and a unifying model) (Edmans, Holderness 2017)

Theory

Governance through exit with –

• • Single blockholder (Edmans JF 2009)
  • Multiple blockholders (Edmans, Manso RFS 2011)
  • Multiple firms (Edmans, Levit, Reilly RFS 2019)

Responsible investment to reduce externalities (Edmans, Levit, Schneemeier 2022)

Use of debt to induce blockholder monitoring (Edmans JFE 2011)

Empirics

Effect of liquidity on governance (Edmans, Fang, Zur RFS 2013)